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ABSTRACT  
The UK Government challenged construction to achieve 50% faster delivery and a 33% 
reduction of clients' capital costs by 2025 – prevailing business models won't meet these 
targets. Eliminating waste from construction design and delivery as advocated by lean 
ideals is therefore a necessary step towards these goals. However, waste understood 
simply as the improvement of current processes rather than fundamental system 
redesign will not be enough. Obtaining a better understanding and conceptualisation of 
waste in construction is therefore becoming more crucial. One aspect of this is to 
challenge the apparent coherence of prevailing procurement practices generated by the 
institutional, organisational, and commercial environments that surround the design and 
delivery of construction projects. This paper contributes to this by examining Tier 1 
contractors and presents examples of practices that open debate on how to challenge 
prevailing procurement models for construction. Through literature review and 
interviews, the study discusses the factors influencing the ‘Principal-Agent’ 
relationship demonstrating how procurement arrangements often mirror institutional 
forces. These forces do not necessarily guarantee better value services, they are more 
likely to serve the interests of large industry players with the bargaining power to create 
new rules (North, 1994). A radically different delivery model, where the client intends 
to eliminate the management fees and confrontational behaviours of their Tier 1 
contractors is described.  
KEYWORDS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The UK Government has created a set of challenging construction targets for 2025. 
These are: 33% lower costs, 50% faster delivery, 50% lower emissions, 50% 
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improvement in exports (HM Government, 2013). Prevailing ‘business as usual’ 
approaches won't meet these targets. Obtaining a better understanding and 
conceptualisation of waste, as understood from a lean perspective, in construction is 
therefore becoming more crucial, in order to prepare the industry for the radical change 
demanded of it. Certainly, one aspect of this is the consideration of how the 
institutional, organisational, and commercial environments that surround the design and 
delivery of construction projects remain coherent even though they pre-dispose them 
to wasteful practice. (Pasquire et al., 2015). In an attempt to explain this phenomenon 
of coherence within the prevailing construction business models, this study looks at one 
aspect, the buyer-main supplier relationship. In particular, the study aims to reflect upon 
and stimulate debate on the functionality and production effectiveness of Tier 1 
contractors (management contractors). This critical review draws upon Agency Theory 
and transaction cost economics (TCE), as they seem to provide insights into why 
conflict and adversarial relationships persist. The underlying premise is that if we can 
understand the cause of coherence and reveal the waste generated as a consequence 
then the adoption of lean construction may be more widespread. The paper presents a 
case study where the ‘Principle – Agent’ relationship is radically different and 
concludes by summarising the benefits and threats of removing Tier 1 contractors, 
proposing alternative procurement models that are deemed to be more efficient, based 
on the insights of UK industry experts. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study used semi-structured interviews to investigate problems and inefficiencies 
that persist in construction models and procurement practices. The study adopted a 
generic purposive sampling approach (Bryman, 2012), also known as judgment 
sampling. It is a non-random technique that does not demand a set number of 
participants (Etikan et al., 2016). Instead, it puts the research questions under 
investigation at the forefront of sampling considerations (Bryman, 2012). Through this 
approach, the researcher decides what needs to be known, and deliberately chooses 
suitable participants who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of 
their knowledge or experience. Based on these considerations, the study initially 
targeted two industry experts with more than 20 years of relevant practical experience. 
Those experts then proposed other participants who have the experience relevant to this 
study's main research question. Overall, 6 sequential in-depth interviews were 
conducted with industry experts (3 senior consultants and 3 senior managers and 
directors working for leading contracting corporations in the UK), until the study 
reached a saturation state (Bryman (2012). Each interview lasted about an hour, where 
NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software was used to facilitate the transcription and 
analysis of the collected data. 
 
INEFFICIENCIES IN CONSTRUCTION MODELS AND 
PROCUREMENT PRACTICES 
The construction industry is often regarded as confrontational, risk averse, and lacking 
trust and capacity for improvement (Rooke et al., 2003) frequently attributed to factors 
such as fragmentation of the industry, obsolete procurement methods, confusing and 
Are Tier-one Contractors Making their Money out of Wasteful Procurement Arrangements? 
85 
Section 3: Contract and Cost Management 
treacherous contractual arrangements, the highly competitive cost-driven environment, 
and the sequential organisation of construction processes (Egan, 1998). Zimina and 
Pasquire (2011) argued that it is not unusual for construction organisations, because of 
competitive pressure, to rely on making their profits solely through commercial 
processes and manipulating roles with others, rather than improving production 
efficiency. Similarly, Chiang and Cheng (2010) identified that, due to the current highly 
competitive industry, contractors could only make profits if they concentrated their 
efforts on three issues: (1) procurement of building materials; (2) cash flow 
management with their downstream supply chain; and (3) planning for and applying 
for claims.  
Other studies have highlighted associated problems and inefficiencies such as 
opportunistic subcontract procurement practices (Pasquire et al., 2015), the use of 
unfair or ambiguously amended subcontracts (Greenwood, 2001), and late payments 
especially in the UK construction culture (Leitch, 1994; Hughes et al., 2000). These 
practices although underpinned by the drive to reduce costs often have the opposite 
effect causing parties to safeguard their own financial position (Pasquire et al., 2015), 
causing margin slippage, adversarial relationships, and costly and time consuming 
disputes. Furthermore, clients don’t realise the exclusion of subcontractors from most 
of the decisions on design and assessing contract periods and costs can trigger project 
value-loss (waste).  
Wasteful procurement practices have become part of the institution of the 
construction industry —“the way it does business”, creating a need to understand the 
characteristics, strategies and tactics that are more or less obedient to imperfect 
institutional and commercial pressures (Sarhan et al., 2014). Pasquire et al (2015) 
provide insights into the coherence of the current construction model by presenting a 
model focused on managing contracts rather than managing production. The current 
study provides empirical data around the critiques of the role and production 
effectiveness of Tier 1 contractors. This is based on selected responses of interviewees 
of this study as follows: "All the work we do, we subcontract it to subcontractors....So 
we do the management of the scheme. We don't really do much work ourselves. There 
are elements of labour, but most of the work that we do is just management of 
subcontractors" (Site Agent at a leading infrastructure group in the UK, January 2016). 
This was described in more depth by another interviewee from a different company: ".. 
the main 'make-or-buy’ decision goes to the buyer...We do not ourselves deliver very 
much at all. We rely on our supply chain to do much of that. They have the experts. We 
act as an integrator, our role is to getting all that effort together successfully delivered. 
But……when it comes to what actually happens out there in the field, most of the time 
we will not do it ourselves, we rely on our partners or supply-chain partners to do that 
for us" (Head of Supply Chain, major UK construction & civil engineering contractor, 
November 2015). 
AGENCY THEORY AND TRANSACTIONAL THEORY 
Agency theory is a branch of transactional cost economics (TCE) that aims to devise 
efficient ways to constrain the opportunistic behaviour of agents (Walker and Wing, 
1999). The focal point of Agency theory is the goal conflict inherent when individuals 
(or organisations) with different preferences, risk attitudes and division of labour 
engage in a cooperative effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, the unit of analysis is the 
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contract, the theory seeks to determine the most efficient contractual mechanism 
governing the principle-agent relationship. According to Eisenhardt (1989), TCE and 
Agency theory have similar dependent variables; hierarchies roughly respond to 
behaviour-based contracts while markets correspond to out-come based contracts (see 
Figure 1). The main difference between the two theories, however, is that Agency 
theory emphasis ex-ante incentive alignment and efficient risk bearing, while TCE is 
mainly concerned with governing ex-post stages of contract (Williamson, 2000). Table 
1 summarises the similarities and contrasts between the fundamental assumptions of 
Agency theory and other Organisational theories. 
Table 1: Comparison between agency theory's assumptions and other organisational 
theories (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
Assumptions 
Theoretical Perspective 
Political Contingency 
Organizational 
Control 
TCE 
Agency  
Theory 
Self-interest  X   X X 
Goal conflict X   X X 
Bounded Rationality  X X X X 
Information asymmetry  X  X X 
Pre-eminence of efficiency  X X X X 
Risk aversion     X 
Information as a commodity      X 
      
 
Agency theory broadened risk-sharing literature by attempting to resolve two 
governance problems in the principal-agency relationship where one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the Agent) to perform the work (Eisenhardt, 
1989), see Figure 1. At the heart of Principal-Agent theory is the trade-off between: (a) 
The cost of measuring behaviour; and (b) The cost of measuring outcomes and 
transferring risk to the agent. According to Walker and Wing (1999), these include both 
the cost of constraining the agent's behaviour (or of the agent's opportunistic behaviour 
if the cost of constraining it is higher) and the cost of loss in productivity and flexibility 
as a result of the constraint. In particular, the theory seeks to identify whether a 
behaviour orientated contract is more efficient that an outcome orientated contract. 
Outcome contracts are those that allow customers to pay only when specified outcomes 
are delivered, while behaviour-based contracts support process and social control. 
Agency theory conceptualizes information as a commodity that has a cost and can be 
purchased. Thus, the principal has two main options (Eisenhardt 1989). Firstly, to 
monitor and discover the agent's behaviour by investing in information systems (e.g. 
monitoring and reporting procedures, additional layers of management). Secondly, to 
contract on the outcomes of the agent's behaviour. 
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     Antecedents Governance Problems Governance Solutions 
Figure 1: A simplified model of the Principal-Agency relationship problems 
 
This contractual arrangement might motivate behaviour by co-aligning the agent's 
interests and incentives with those of the principal, but at the price of transferring risk 
to the agent. Based on the principles of the Agency theory and TCE, Figure 2 illustrates 
the variables influencing the principal's choice in the form of guiding propositions. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual model showing the relationship between transactional variables 
and governance arrangements [modified from Esienhardt (1989) and Paquire et al. 
(2015)] 
THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL FORCES ON 
CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT MODELS  
Construction procurement practices are shaped by institutional structures, beliefs and 
attitudes as well as project characteristics (Sarhan et al., 2014, Pasquire et al., 2015). 
For instance, unregulated public sector, regulated industry and private building sector 
practices can provide a contrast in institutional approaches to accountability, the desire 
Verification of the 
Agent's behaviour is 
expensive or difficult 
Conflict in goals and 
desires between P&A 
Difference in attitudes 
towards risk between 
P&A 
The Agency 
Problem 
The Risk-sharing 
problem 
Hybrid/Intermixed (e.g. 
cooperative arrangements such as 
IPD and TVD) 
Markets or outcome-based 
contracts   (e.g. outsourcing and 
using contracts with incentives ) 
or 
Hierarchies or behaviour-based 
contracts (e.g. In-house production 
or investing in information systems) 
or 
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for cost transparency, and ways of achieving that through procurement strategies. Thus, 
it could be argued that construction models and procurement practices often mirror 
institutional factors. An example of this was identified during the data collection 
process of this study - "The (UK) Highways Agency was held up as an exemplar of 
…improved efficiency in roads management and maintenance. So Local Authorities 
were then encouraged by Central Government to look at this model. The now limited 
number of contractors were pleased to extol the virtues of the Highways Agency’s 
model to a local government market which they could also see turning into a market 
with a limited number of players able to deliver large, integrated service contracts. 
Local authorities often asked the market (contractors) what scale of efficiencies could 
be delivered if they were to let a single large integrated manage and maintain contract. 
The contractors usually came back with the same reply, “20%”. There was never any 
real evidence for this. Twenty per cent seemed to be a figure all the authorities would 
like to achieve and the major contractors were happy to tell them they could achieve it. 
So the whole industry created a belief that integrated service contracts delivered by 
one (Tier 1) contractor with a chain of (Tier 2) suppliers was the most efficient form of 
delivery..." (Fellow of the Institute of Civil Engineers (FICE), Senior Consultant, UK, 
January 17, 2016, E-mail message). 
From the words above, it is clear that institutional forces (e.g. 'vested interests' and 
'bargaining strength' of major industry players) can have an influence on shaping 
procurement practices. This argument is supported by North (1994) who stressed that 
the formal rules within institutions are (normally) created to serve the interests of those 
with the bargaining power to create those rules. In practical terms, this is also evidenced 
by the unilateral movement towards large integrated contracts seen in the UK highways 
sector described above. A change in the status of the Principal is causing new rules to 
be developed "... now the Highways Agency has transmorphed into Highways England, 
a regulated, arms-length government company with greater accountability for costs 
and performance, Highways England is now recruiting greater procurement and 
commercial management staff. It is also fragmenting contracts in order to secure 
greater control and visibility of costs" (FICE, Senior Consultant, UK, January 17, 2016, 
E-mail message).   
LATE PAYMENT AND THE RESISTANCE TO PROJECT BANK ACCOUNTS 
Late payment is a major problem (Proverbs et al., 2000), and a most institutionalised 
wasteful practice (Sarhan et al., 2014), in the UK construction culture in specific 
(Leitch, 1994; Hughes, 2000). Historically, it is has not been unusual for lower Tier 
suppliers, in an industry in which about 99% of businesses are SMEs, to have to wait 
for up to 100 days to receive payment (Cabinet Office, 2012); due to Tier 1 contractors 
creating profit from cash flow at the expense of their supply chain (Klein, 2015). This 
may lead to increased cash flow borrowing, poor performance and associated costs 
increasing the burden of risk on the supply chain (Leitch, 1994; Klein, 2015). 
According to the Cabinet Office (2012b), late and unfair payment practices cause 1% - 
2.5% of wastage in the cost of projects attributed to factors such as: supply chain 
members' unnecessary overheads relating to debt chasing and administration, costly 
payment disputes which ultimately feed back into costs for the client, and potential 
insolvencies and costs of production losses due to lack of collaboration and trust. 
Consequently, Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) were introduced in 2009 by the 
Cabinet Office in collaboration with public sector clients, as a means to enhancing cost 
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transparency and revolutionising the way members of construction supply chains get 
paid (Cabinet Office, 2012b; Biddell, 2015). In PBA, supply chain members, do not 
need to wait for higher Tier contractors to process payment; instead they receive it 
directly through a bank account specific to the project they are working on, allowing 
them to concentrate on production delivery (Cabinet Office, 2012b).  
Highways England is now using PBAs on all its works, and The Northern Ireland 
Executive has mandated the use of PBAs, since January 2013, on all construction 
projects above £1m. Many contractors in the UK are acknowledging that PBAs create 
a greater collaborative effort along the supply chain. However, some are still battling 
against their implementation (Klein, 2015). For instance, some contractors argue that 
PBAs have led to complications with the construction industry tax scheme and VAT; 
however these claims were ruled-out by the tax authority (Klein, 2015). Klein reported 
that "Willmott Dixon went public with their views on PBAs [claiming that:] where 
responsible payment terms are applied, PBAs are not necessary" (Klein, 2015). They 
then criticized PBAs by professing that they are bureaucratic, costly, and onerous for 
the client. According to Wynne and Hansford (2014), many Tier 1 contractors claim a 
tedious administrative effort for the management of the multiple accounts in the system 
adding significant overhead to their businesses. Consequently lead contractors, relying 
on their bargaining power as major industry players, push for the use of other supply-
chain payment arrangements to end the use of PBAs such as Early Payment Schemes 
and the Fair Payment Charter. However, Klein (2013) condemns the former for being 
unfair to subcontractors and for reinforcing traditional business models; while the latter 
can be criticised for its subjective language.  
Hansford (ICE past President and former UK Government Chief Construction 
advisor) said about PBAs: “Perhaps to a degree it was taking a sledgehammer to crack 
a nut. I don’t regard them as being the panacea” (Wynne and Hansford, 2014). Instead 
he suggested widespread adoption of the new charter would remove the need for project 
bank accounts (Hansford, cited in Wynne and Hansford, 2014). In contrast, Klein 
(2015) believes that "if firms are paying responsibly they should not have any issue 
with PBAs".  
 
Having reviewed aspects of theory and practice surrounding Tier 1 contractors we now 
discussed a model that removes them from the construction process altogether. 
 
LONDON UNDERGROUND'S STAKE DELIVERY MODE 
With the ambition of cutting costs by 25%, London Underground's (LU's) senior 
management team decided to cut-out main contractors altogether (Tier 1 and 2). 
Working directly with specialist subcontractors, they used consultants to supervise the 
work on the £330m Station Stabilisation programme over a period of seven years 
(Morby, 2014). Using an apparent lean philosophy 'production leads, everything else 
enables’, they focused their efforts on working more closely with those specialists who 
actually produce the work. The Stake Delivery Model is a Government Treasury trial 
project under its Infrastructure UK office (Morby, 2014), designed to deliver the 
efficiency improvements outlined in the McNulty Report (2011). According to Morby 
(2014) the Stake Delivery Model key principles include: 
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 Engaging with the trade contractors and specialists who actually do the work on-
site, 
 Simplifying contractual arrangements with LU taking most of the risk, 
 Providing long term commitments to suppliers, 
 Creating a ‘one team’ approach to project delivery. 
BENEFITS AND THREATS OF CUTTING OUT TIER 1 CONTRACTORS 
Having provided a brief overview of an emerging construction procurement and 
delivery model that aims to eliminate the costs of procuring the services of Tier 1 
contractors, next we summarise the main benefits and threats of this model based on 
the insights of UK experts. 
Table 2: Main benefits and threats of cutting out Tier 1 contractors 
Main Benefits Main Threats/Challenges 
Getting rid of that sort of 
confrontational litigation that often 
occurs towards the end of projects 
Requires appropriate commercial alignments and 
conversations at an early stage, to avoid double man-
marking of trades under cost-reimbursement contracts. 
Reduces overall cost as client now 
pays the subcontractors directly. 
Thus, eliminates perceived inflated 
costs due to ‘margin on margin’. i.e. 
the Tier 1 contractor has a margin 
to make on top of the margins the 
Tier 2 suppliers make. Also 
transfers advantage of  competition 
perceived to be locked into Tier 1 
frameworks. 
Increases client risk e.g. oversight management of the 
H&S issues - the client now becomes the Principal 
Contractor (under UK CDM Regs) and has the overall 
responsibility for safety. Also, client becomes 
responsible for managing the interfaces between 
activities carried out by different sub-contractors and 
the risk with the overall delays. Similarly, if there are 
gaps in the design or in the scope of the supply, there 
is no one for the client to blame other than themselves 
and thus the client has to pay for it. 
Allows client to use smaller 
contractors creating innovative 
opportunities to value engineer and 
collaborate. 
Few clients have competencies to manage the 
works/sub-contractors or have a good knowledge of 
construction activities/suppliers/the market. Client 
team will need to employ new people to build expertise 
which is time consuming and can be costly. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Principal-Agency relationship is a typical problem that is deeply institutionalised 
in our coherent construction business model (Pasquire et al., 2015). Construction 
procurement models seem to be in contrast with the two options offered by Agency 
theory. They are mainly concerned with either: (1) contracting on the outcomes of the 
agent's behaviour; or (2) monitoring and controlling behaviour. Based on Figure (1), it 
appears that the first option (i.e. outcome based contracts) could be suitable for a 
commodity market; but it is definitely inappropriate for the nature of the construction 
industry that is characterised by its high levels of complexity and uncertainty. However, 
many construction decision makers still persist in adopting conventional procurement 
arrangements, which stand in contrast to out-come based contracts and increase 
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governance challenges; whilst the use of process and social-based contracts seem to be 
much less prevalent.  
On the reasons for the coherence of the prevailing construction model, work by 
Pasquire et al.(2015) referred this to a model focused on managing contracts rather than 
managing production. This study supplements their work by shedding light on the 
influence of the bargaining power that can enable major industry players (e.g. Tier-1 
contractors) to dictate the rules of the game – the way we do business. In this study, the 
main benefits and challenges of a radically different construction model, which aims to 
cut-off main contractors altogether, was discussed. Based on the opinions of UK 
industry experts who participated in this study, it appears that the threats/challenges of 
this model outweigh its benefits. Alternative approaches worth further investigation 
include: (1) Procuring Tier 1 management contractors to act as 'Management Agents' 
based on a small fee in relation to the total value of the product, but an incentive for 
minimising total product cost could be large in relation to that fee in order to encourage 
total cost minimisation; and (2) Procuring large Engineering firms based on a 'Design 
and Manage' responsibility. This approach provides actual producers (i.e. specialist 
suppliers) with more freedom to value engineer, and it eliminates the role of the Tier 1 
main contractor's design coordinator who sits between the site-operations teams and the 
lead designer. 
REFERENCES  
Biddell, L. (2015) "Implementation of Project Bank Accounts across Highways 
England"; Available at: http://www.secgroup.org.uk/ 
Bryman, A. (2012) 'Social Research Methods', 4th Edition, Oxford University Press: 
NewYork 
Cabinet Office (2012a) "Project Bank Accounts – Briefing document"; available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/project-bank-accounts 
Cabinet Office (2012b) "A-guide to Project Bank Accounts in-construction for 
government clients"; available at: https://www.gov.uk/ 
Chiang, Y. and Cheng, E. (2010) ‘Construction loans and industry development: the 
case of Hong Kong’, Construction Management and Economics, 28(9), 959-969 
Egan, J. (1998) Rethinking Construction: Report of the Construction Task Force, 
London:HMSO. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). "Agency theory: An assessment and review." Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. 
Etikan, I. Musa, S.A., Alkassim, R. (2016). "Comparison of Convenience Sampling and 
Purposive Sampling." American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics, 5(1), 
pp. 1-4.   
Greenwood, D. (2001) 'Subcontract procurement: are relationships changing?', 
Construction Management and Economics, 19(1), 5-7 
HM Government (2013). "Construction 2025 - Industrial Strategy: government and 
industry in partnership"; Available at: www.official-documents.gov.uk 
Hughes , W., Hillebrandt, P., and Murdoch, J. (2000) 'The impact of contract duration 
on the cost of cash retention', Construction Management and Economics, 18(1), 11-
14 
Klein, R. (2013). "Early payment schemes: The industry disease."; Available at: 
http://www.building.co.uk/ 
Saad Sarhan , Christine Pasquire , Emmanuel Manu , and Andrew King 
92 Proceeding IGLC-24, July 2016 | Boston, USA 
Klein, R. (2015) "PBAs: Tell it like it is"; Available at: www.building.co.uk 
Leitch, J. (1994) Late pay only 'a British problem', Contract Journal, 31 March, 2. 
Morby, A. (2014). "Main contractors dumped from £330m tube stations revamp"; 
Available at: www.constructionenquirer.com/ 
North, D. (1994). “Economic performance through time.” The American Economic 
Review, 84(3), 359-368 
Pasquire, C., Sarhan, S. & King, A. (2015). “A Critical Review of the Safeguarding 
Problem in Construction Procurement: Unpicking the Coherent Current Model.” 
Proceedings of the IGLC-23,  Perth, Australia, pp 309-318 
Proverbs, D G, Holt, G D and Cheok, H Y (2000) Construction industry problems: the 
views of UK construction directors. In: Akintoye, A (Ed.), 16th Annual ARCOM 
Conference, Glasgow Caledonian University, Vol. 1, 73-81. 
Rooke, J., Seymour, D. and Fellows, R. (2003) 'The claims culture; A Taxonomy of attitudes 
in the industry', Construction Management and Economics, 21(2), 167-174  
Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C. and King A. (2014). “Institutional Waste within the 
Construction Industry: An outline. ” Proceedings of the IGLC-22, Oslo, Norway, 
June, pp 895-906 
Walker, A. and Wing, C. K. (1999). "The relationship between construction project 
management theory and transaction cost economics." Engineering, Construction 
and Architectural Management, (6)2, 166-176. 
Williamson, O.E. (2000) The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking 
ahead, Journal of Economics Literature, 38(3), (Sep., 2000), 595-613 
Wynne, A.  and Hansford, M. (2014) "Fair payment charter could spell end of project 
bank accounts." Available at: http://www.newcivilengineer.com/  
Zimina, D. and Pasquire, C. (2011) ‘Tracking the dependencies between companies 
commercial behaviour and their institutional environment’, Proc. IGLC-19, Peru
